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I 
One of the mostperplexing passages in Wittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations occurs in Part Two where it 
is asserted: "Ifa lion could talk, we could not understand 
him."[ This remark has been interpreted as anything from 
a mere comment concerning our conception of a lion to 
an empirical claim regarding the communicative 
capacities of lions and nonhumans in general to a highly 
speculative assertion as to the possibility of there being 
radical incommensurability among language-users.2 
Whichever interpretation is correct, Wittgenstein's claim, 
if true, does not bode well for those of us who would like 
to assign rights to animals. Since the assignment of rights 
typically proceeds on the determination of interests, 
should it tum out that we would not understand aninlals 
in spite of theirpossessing language, then surely the whole 
task ofassigning rights to animals is hopeless. My purpose 
is to clarify the meaning ofWittgenstein's statement and 
to determine whether what he says is true. I shall argue 
that what has emerged as the received view on the remark 
is wrong. The received view (as I shall call it) interprets 
the remark as expressing Wittgenstein's belief that there 
could exist "forms of life" so different in nature that their 
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respective practitioners could fail in every respect to 
understand one another. The received view also maintains 
that while radical incommensurability remains a 
possibility, it is highly unlikely that such an event would 
ever occuramong organisms which share certain relevant 
biological features. In contrast, I maintain that the remark 
is primarily about the nature of understanding 
("verstehen"), and that a careful analysis of the text 
indicates that what we refer to as "our 'understanding' of 
human languages and behaviors" differs severely from 
"our 'understanding' ofanimal languages andbehaviors." 
This sort of analysis has both advantages and disadvan-
tages. Perhaps the greatestdisadvantage is that ascriptions . 
of mental states (interests) to animals, indeed the very 
study ofanimal languages and behaviors, must be viewed 
as quite different in nature from the ascription of mental 
states to humans and the study of human languages and 
behaviors. This makes the assignment of rights to 
nonhumans tricky business. On the other hand, the 
principal advantage of this kind of analysis is that it 
diffuses the very serious attack on animal mentality 
offered by Stephen Stich.3 
II 
Let me return to the matter of why Wittgenstein's 
remark is so puzzling and why the received view has 
come to be accepted. The passage is perplexing for two 
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reasons. First., what is asserted in the passage is very 
out of character with most of his claims concerning 
animals. Most of his comments pertain to the fact that 
if animals were to possess (or do possess) languages, 
then those languages would lack that characteristic of 
human languages which Charles Hockett calls 
"displacement," viz., the capacity to refer to objects and 
events which are far removed in time and space or which 
are counter-factual in nature.4 For example, concerning 
dogs he says: 
We say a dog is afraid his master will beat 
him; but not, he is afraid his master will beat 
him tomorrow. Why not?5 
We can imagine an animal angry, frightened, 
unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful? And 
why not? 
A dog believes his master is at the door. But 
can he also believe his master will come the 
day after tomorrow? - And what can he not 
do here?6 
A similar remark is made concerning orangutans in 
Remarks on the Philosophy ofPsychology, Volume One: 
It is easy to imagine an orangutan angry-but 
hopeful? And why is it like this?7 
And concerning crocodiles: 
[H]ope, belief, etc., [are] embedded in human 
life, in all of the situations and reactions which 
constitute human life. The crocodile doesn't 
hope, man does. Or: one can't say of a 
crocodile that it hopes, but of man one can.8 
These passages suggest animals lack the orientation 
toward the future which characterizes such human 
phenomena as hope and despair. A similar passage 
concerning the inability of dogs to feel remorse is meant 
to suggest a corresponding lack of orientation toward 
the past.9 The point is tllat tllere could be nothing in 
animal behavior (or language) which corresponds to 
our own expression of tllese phenomena. But., ofcourse, 
Wittgenstein would not have regarded displacement as 
a necessary component of every language-game. On 
the contrary, he regards language-game (2), the block-
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pillar-Slab-beam language-game (which is no more 
complex than the system of calls used by vervet 
monkeys as warning signals), as a complete language. 1O 
Atmost., then, the above remarks point to a non-essential 
difference between human and nonhuman forms of 
communication. 
A second reason why the comment about tile lion is 
so puzzling is that on more than one occasion 
Wittgenstein asserts that we are quite capable of 
understanding animal behavior, indeed, that at times 
we may even understand animals better than we 
understand our fellow humans. For example, he asks 
us to imagine a tribe ofhumans who never express their 
feelings.u Their lives and ours would differ in many 
crucial ways: that which occasions a sympathetic reaction 
on our part (say, to someone being in pain) occasions 
no response from them. We are tempted to say: 
'These men would have nothing human 
about them.' 
Why?-We could not possibly make ourselves 
understood to them. Not even as we can to a 
dog. We could not find our feet with them. 
And yet there surely could be such beings, who 
in other respects are human.12 
And in an interesting passage which almost immedi-
ately precedes the lion remark in Philosophical 
Investigations, Part Two, he says: 
We also say of some people that they are 
transparent to us. It is, however, important as 
regards this observation that one human being 
can be a complete enigma. We learn tllis when 
we come into a strange country with entirely 
strange traditions; and, what is more, even given 
a mastery of the country's language. We do not 
understand the people. (And not because of not 
knowing what they are saying to themselves.) 
We cannot find our feet with themP 
Wittgenstein clearly denies that being members of the 
same species is either a necessary or a sufficient 
condition for mutual understanding. So why, if a lion 
could talk, would we be unable to understand it? 
Commentators have regarded Wittgenstein as 
merely affmning the possibility of radical incommen-
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surability without endorsing the view that such 
incommensurability actually exists. Perhaps the most 
explicit defense of this position is that offered by John 
Churchill. Churchill maintains that Wittgenstein is 
"denying the assurance of commensurability without 
embracing radical incommensurabilism."14 Proponents 
of this view may paraphrase the lion comment saying, 
"If a lion could talk, we might not understand it." (The 
actual German is: "Wenn ein LOwe sprechen kt5nnte, 
wir kt5nnten ihn nicht verstehen.") That radical 
incommensurability is only a possibility is suggested 
by the conditions which would make it possible. What 
makes the language and behavior of the tribe described 
earlier incommensurable is not that they simply fail to 
express emotions which they possess (as if incommen-
surbility amounted to not being able to decipher what's 
hidden in another's heart); rather, their patterns of 
behavior, their interests, differ from our own.15 Differing, 
thus, in our forms of life, we imagine them as possessing 
sets of concepts entirely different from our own. 
Remember, for Wiugenstein, the types of concepts 
a group shares are determined by its form of life, rather 
than vice versa. What is essential to a concept is its 
role. The behavior on the basis of which we ascribe to 
a subject a particular concept or its application is not 
some non-essential accompaniment to the concept 
itself.16 So when Wiugenstein refers to the "common 
behavior of mankind" as "the system of reference by 
means of which we interpret an unknown language" 17 
he is not merely making the epistemological claim that 
behavior provides us with reliable inductive evidence 
for the ascription of concepts to others; he is claiming, 
rather, that such behavior is definitive of the concepts 
themselves. This suggests that the commensurability 
of the languages of two groups can be determined 
through an examination of their respective forms of life. 
Many scholars, however, follow J.EM. Hunter in 
believing that forms of life are at least in part constituted 
by biological factors. 18 This view has most recently been 
attributed to Wiugenstein by John Churchill who says: 
"Wiugenstein posits a universal behavioural substratum 
whose shaping influence on language is sufficient to 
make all human languages commensurable."19 So the 
languages of two organisms will be commensurable at 
least to the degree to which the organisms share 
biologically innate behavioral dispositions. Wiugenstein 
describes these behavioral dispositions as primitive 
reactions to one's environment and to the behavior of 
others which are later replaced, in humans at least, by 
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linguistic forms of behavior.2o Consequently" whether 
the lion's language would be commensurable would 
depend upon our being able to relate what the lion says 
to certain primitive dispositions which we share. Since 
this would seem to be the way to view the issue, it is 
not surprising to find writers like Bernard Rollin saying: 
[The claim that] we could not understand a 
lion if it spoke... seems implausible. I venture 
to suggest that our forms of life are not all that 
dissimilar: both the lion and I have interests 
in eating, sleeping, sex, avoiding encroach-
ments on our environments, and so forth about 
which we could doubtless make small talk.21 
In a similar vein, John Churchill asks: 
Who has not rubbed a dog's ears, or scratched 
beneath a dog's chin? Our capacities for 
communication with dogs, surely, are rooted 
in a shared mammalian nature.22 
Neither Churchill nor Rollin go so far as to attribute 
total commensurability to the languages and behaviors 
of humans and nonhumans. But the claim lhat their 
respective languages and behaviors are radically 
incommensurate would have to be reg21rded as 
thoroughly unwarranted. And so it is with the 
interpretation of Wittgenstein's lion remark as one 
which espouses radical incommensurability, since the 
grounds for rejecting radical incommensurability are 
Wiugenstein's own. 
III 
I believe that this interpretation of Wiugenstein's 
remark is inaccurate and that he did indeed advocate 
some version of the incommensurability thesis. Two 
distinct objections can be raised against the received 
view. The second of these forms the basis for my 
attributing to Wittgenstein the view that understanding 
animals differs from understanding humans in an 
essential way. 
First, we might acceptWittgenstein's view that most 
psychological predicates may be attributed only to "a 
living human being and what resembles (behaves like) 
a living human being"23 without accepting the view that 
just any biologically innate behavioral disposition can 
serve as the basis for such attributions.IfWittgenstein 
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accepted anything like a universal behavioral 
substratum (to use Churchill's phrase), then that 
substratum consists primarily of human facial 
expressions. "The face," he wrote in 1932, "is the soul 
of the body."24 Facial expressions are what is primitive, 
pre-linguistic. It is to them that we react spontaneously 
and with sympathy.25 (That there is a set of facial 
expressions common to and immediately recognizable 
to all humans has been confumed in the research of 
Paul Ekman. The set consists of expressions of 
happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise.26) 
The imaginary tribe whose members Wittgenstein 
describes as never expressing feelings would be 
incomprehensible to us in that we would be unable to 
associate what they say with certain characteristic forms 
ofbehavior. It is crucial to notice that, for Wittgenstein, 
a lack of understanding may occur in spite of the fact 
that one knows the truth conditions of a speaker's 
utterance.27 Before a speaker's utterance can even be 
the kind of thing that is true or false, it must be uttered 
in an appropriate context. An utterance which fails to 
satisfy this condition is neither true nor false, but 
nonsensical. Facial expressions (and certain other forms 
of behavior) belong to the contextual determinants of 
meaning. This does not mean that there must be some 
typical facial accompaniment to each and every 
utterance; that would be absurd. But it does mean that 
an utterance must be spoken in a context in which tJle 
speaker could convey (or could be imagined as 
conveying) his or her purpose by means of primitive, 
pre-linguistic behaviors. (Imagine the look of assertion 
or of puzzlement.) Where a connection between an 
utterance and a facial expression is unimaginable, Ulere 
understanding is impossible. We rely upon such 
information as is contained in a glance when interpreting 
a speaker's words and when determining what a speaker 
expects of us. Wittgenstein's imaginary tribe consists 
of a group of people of whom we could have no 
expectations and with respect to whom we would be 
unable to determine what is expected ofus. That is what 
Wittgenstein means when he says we would be unable 
to find ourfeet with these people. Wittgenstein's lion is 
in very much the same boat. The lion's utterances would 
not be connected to facial expressions in the appropriate 
way. (When we try to imagine a talking lion, as in the 
fairy tales, don't we also imagine Ule lion with a 
somewhat human face?) The point is that the lion's 
utterances would be meaningless to us; they would fail 
to occur within a context in which they might have sense. 
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It seems to me that a fairly straightforward objection 
could be raised against Wittgenstein's view as I've 
described it here, namely, that me faces of animals, 
particularly mammals, are quite expressive. They may 
not possess the full range of expressions which 
characterize the human face, but to the extent that they 
possess any range at all, to that extent their behavior is 
commensurate with our own. 
Wittgenstein's response to this objection requires 
mat facial expressions be viewed as akin to a system of 
signs in which the meaning of any given element is 
determined by its relation to the other elements. If any 
single element is removed, men me significance of each 
of the remaining elements is altered. It is relevant in this 
respect that he often refers to the human face and even the 
human body as a kind of picture. For example, he says, 
The content of an emotion-here one imagines 
something like a picture, or something of 
which a picture can be made. (The darkness 
of depression which descends on a man, the 
flames of anger.) The human face too might 
be called such a picture and its alterations 
might represent the course of a passion.28 
And the elements of the picture are internally related 
to one another: 
Suppose someone had always seen faces wim 
only one expression, say a smile. And now, 
for the first time, he sees a face changing its 
expression. Couldn't we say here that he 
hadn't noticed a facial expression until now? 
Not until the change took place was the 
expression meaningful; earlier it was simply 
part of me anatomy of the face. 29 
[P]ain ... has a characteristic expression 
within the repertory of facial expressions 
and gestures.30 
Feigning and its opposite exist only when 
there is a complicated play ofexpressions. 31 
Expression could be said to exist only in the 
play of the features. 32 
Wittgenstein's view that facial expressions are internally 
related to one another stems from his belief that were 
159 Between the Species 
Why We Would Not Understand a Talking Lion 
they not so, then specific expressions would not be 
recognizable. Divorced from a system of expressions 
the specific expression would merely be part of "the 
anatomy of the animal."33 I would guess that it is largely 
an empirical issue whether our ability to recognize 
specific expressions is dependent on the existence of 
a system ofexpressions. My impression of the research 
in this area is that it supports Wittgenstein's claim.34 
Be that as it may, if facial expressions are internally 
related to one another, then any degree of difference 
between human and nonhuman expression would be 
a significant difference. Thus, for Wittgenstein, 
arguments which emphasize the degree of similarity 
between human and nonhuman behavior would amount 
to red herrings. 
Turn now to the second principal objection which 
may be brought against the received view. Proponents 
of that view believe that the process which culminates 
in the understanding of animal behavior is very much 
the same sort of process as that which culminates in the 
understanding of human behavior. In either case, it is 
thought, observation ofbehavior leads to the attribution 
of concepts (and other mental state ascriptions) which, 
in tum, afford us a certain amount ofpredictive power. 
While the inference from behavior to mental state is 
more immediate in the case of humans (given, 
presumably, our greater familiarity with human 
behavior), in each case the goal of the process is largely 
the same: the prediction of behavior. I would like to 
argue (and attribute to Wittgenstein the view) that 
understanding human behavior does not consist in being 
able to predict it. 
While it is true that we form expectations of our 
fellow humans and often have these expectations 
satisfied (and to that extent predict their behavior), I 
maintain that there is a threshold beyond which, if 
human behavior becomes too predictable, we say we 
no longer understand the behavior in question. Indeed, 
we can no longer say that what we've observed is 
behavior (except in the sense in which we speak of the 
"behavior" ofeven rocks and molecules). Now it might 
seem that Wittgenstein does equate understanding 
with predictive power. How, after all, are we to 
interpret his remark about "finding our feet" with 
respect to the strange tribesmen? Also, how are we to 
interpret his remarks in Philosophical Investigations 
concerning the similarity between sentences like "Now 
I understand!" and "Now I can go on!" ifunderstanding 
is something other than predictive power? "Being able 
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to go on" appears to refer to an ability to anticipate 
various kinds of events. True enough. But then in a 
passage written in 1948 which appears in Culture and 
Value he writes: 
Life's infinite variations are essential to our 
life. And so to even the habitual character of 
life. What we regard as expression consists in 
incalculability. If I knew exactly how he would 
grimace, move, there would be no facial 
expression, no gesture.35 
The problem with the expressionless tribesmen is not 
that we have an insufficient amount of behavior on 
which to base predictions; rather, their movements are 
too mechanical, too rigid, to count any longer as 
expressive behavior. For a particular bit of behavior to 
count as a facial expression it is not sufficient merely 
that it be a specific form of expression within a system 
of expression. Specific expressions must exhibit a 
degree of variability from person to person and from 
instance to instance: 
Variability itself is characteristic of behaviour 
without which behaviour would be to us as 
something completely different. (The facial 
features characteristic of grief, for instance, are 
not more meaningful than their mobility.)36 
Thus, understanding a facial expression requires more 
than its mere categorization; it involves a recognition 
of uniqueness. Nor is reacting to a facial expression 
merely reacting in a set, predetermined fashion; it 
involves tailoring one's reaction to the uniqueness of 
the situation. As sociolinguists are quick to remind us, 
speakers vary their form of expression to locate 
themselves (and allow themselves to be located) in what 
one writer describes as "a highly complex multi-
dimensional social space."3? Or perhaps it would be 
more apt for us to say that speakers use variation to 
eke out a position within social space. It is wrong, on 
this view, to identify the meaning of an expression 
with something (some mental content) which two 
individuals share in common when the one understands 
the other. Instead the meaning of an expression is a 
relation of sorts existing between those who express 
themselves and the individuals to whom they express 
themselves. Expressing oneself does not involve 
"conveying" something (a meaning) from one mind to 
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another. It has been the error of philosophers from 
Plato to Frege to Katz to try to explain away variation 
and unpredictability by postulating entities like 
meanings which exist in the mind or are "grasped" by 
acts which originate in the mind.38 For Wiugenstein, in 
contrast, unpredictability and expressive variability are 
of the essence!39 
These considerations are important for two reasons. 
First, we may conclude that Wittgenstein's notion of 
understanding human behavior is much more robust 
than that which would be allowable were the under-
standing of human behavior to be equated with mere 
predictability. In Philosophical Investigations the 
conclusion is drawn most explicitly: 
We speak of understanding a sentence in the 
sense in which it can be replaced by another 
which says the same; but also in the sense in 
which it cannot be replaced by any other. 
(Anymore than one musical theme can be 
replaced by another.) 
In the one case the thought in the sentence is 
something common to different sentences; in 
the other, something that is expressed only by 
these words in these positions. 
Then has "understanding" two different 
meanings here?-I would rather say that 
these kinds of use of "understanding" make 
up its meaning, make up my concept of 
understanding. 
For I want to apply the word "understanding" 
to all this.4o 
When it comes to human beings both the predictable 
and the unpredictable are the "object" of understanding. 
Understanding only seems like prediction when one is 
"severed" (to borrow a word from Heidegger) from the 
situation in which understanding occurs. 
Second, this analysis sheds light upon Wittgenstein's 
remarks concerning why we might, in certain contexts, 
say we understand dogs and other animals even better 
than we understand humans.41 The sense in which 
animals may be more understandable than humans is 
the sense in which they may be more predictable. As 
Wittgenstein points out, the uncertainty one feels as to 
whether animals, like flies and spiders, feel pain does 
not arise from not knowing what to expect, but from 
the fact that one does not know how to react (or whether 
to react) in the presence of their behavior.42 This 
suggests that there could not be an understanding of 
animals in the robust sense of the word. The 
unpredictability which is the earmark of human 
behavior is not found in our interactions wW) animals. 
Consequently, Wittgenstein's remarks concerning 
animals being more understandable than humans in 
certain contexts cannot be taken as expressing a belief 
in partial commensurability. If a lion could talk, we 
could not (in the robust sense) understand him. 
IV 
IfWittgenstein's view is correct, then the assignment 
of rights to animals becomes tricky. I would suggest 
that before an individual can be assigned rights it is 
necessary for that individual to be understood (in the 
sense in which we understand humans). Ifhaving a right 
is anything like staking a claim, then how apart from 
expressive behavior (linguistic and non-linguistic) 
which calls for a recognition of one's individuality 
would this be possible? This does not mean animals 
should not be afforded rights. It only means that a 
different avenue for the assignment of rights would have 
to be found. This is the principal disadvantage of 
Wittgenstein's view. 
Its greatest advantage is that it serves as a counter-
weight to the kind of Stichian analysis which denies 
mentality to humans and nonhumans alike. Stich's 
analysis permits no asymmetries in the assignment of 
mental states and their contents to humans and 
nonhumans.43 On Wittgenstein's view, the mental life 
of animals emerges as ineffable. They resist analysis. 
Perhaps, in the end, it is to this ineffability that we must 
tum if we are to address the moral issues before us. 
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